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Inflation Expectations of Households: 
Do They Influence Wage-Price Dynamics in India? 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the usefulness of survey based measures of inflation expectations to predict 
inflation using hybrid versions of New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). While both 3-months ahead 
and 1-year ahead inflation expectations of households emerge statistically significant in explaining 
and predicting inflation in India, effectively they work as substitutes of backward looking expectations 
given that household expectations are found to be largely adaptive. Unlike in other countries, this 
paper does not find much evidence on flattening of the Phillips curve. When transmission of inflation 
expectations to inflation is assessed through wage dynamics, it is found that inflation expectations of 
households influence growth in staff costs in services sector activities, but not in manufacturing. No 
robust evidence is found, however, on expectations induced wage pressures influencing CPI inflation. 
JEL Classification: E52; E24, E31, P24. 
Keywords: Inflation Expectations; Phillips Curve; Wage-Price Dynamics. 
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1 Introduction  
Inflation and unemployment are the two prominent sources of economic misery in an 
economy. High inflation expectations, by shifting the short-run Phillips curve up, can give 
rise to either higher inflation at unchanged rate of unemployment or higher unemployment 
at unchanged rate of inflation (Sinclair, 2009). A credible central bank committed to the 
price stability objective could anchor inflation expectations and thereby reduce economic 
misery on both counts. First, when inflation overshoots the target, particularly due to 
temporary supply shocks, the employment/output sacrifice needed for disinflating the 
economy would be much lower; and second, by ensuring price stability around the growth 
maximising rate of inflation (or the threshold inflation) it could contribute in the best 
possible way to sustainable high growth and employment. The magnitude of economic 
misery that high inflation expectations could pose, thus, depends on agents’ perception 
about credibility of a central bank’s commitment to price stability.  
 
It is crucial for monetary policy to assess how much the headline inflation may deviate 
from the target because of elevated inflation expectations, and what are the near-term 
and medium-term ramifications for growth and employment of either forcefully resisting 
or accommodating risks to inflation from inflation expectations, no matter what may be 
driving such expectations. If inflation expectations are not anchored by credible monetary 
policy, even if one assumes that expectations are purely adaptive, both supply shocks and 
demand shocks can set off an inflation spiral. Supply shocks like temporary increase in 
food and fuel prices could push inflation up (and reduce output), as a result of which  
adaptive inflation expectations could rise, which in turn could spillover through wage-
price setting responses of agents  to increase  inflation further. Similarly, a positive 
demand shock could increase inflation (and also output), but adaptive expectations would 
fuel an even stronger inflation spiral, backed by expansion in income1. Longer monetary 
policy waits before resisting to break the spiral, higher could be the sacrifice of output 
and employment in the medium-run. In turn, if monetary policy resists proactively 
recognizing the risk of an inflation spiral because of de-anchored inflation expectations, 
                                                          
1 Expectations induced wage-price spiral requires a tight labour market condition. Along with high inflation 
expectations as per the household survey, one should also look at household survey results on the outlook for income 
and employment and actual wage/compensation growth data to assess risks to inflation from high inflation 
expectations (Meyer, 2011). 
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there could be some near-term sacrifice of output, which, however, would be comparatively 
less. Once expectations are anchored through credible commitment to keep inflation closer 
to the target, even when supply and demand shocks lead to inflation deviating from the 
target, return to equilibrium would be faster and also less costly.  Empirical research 
shows that adoption of inflation targeting (with credible commitment to the target) and 
central bank transparency (on following a rule or providing clarity on how monetary 
policy will respond when anticipated and unanticipated risks to inflation materialize) 
reduce sensitivity of longer-term inflation expectations to shocks to inflation, implying 
thereby firmer anchoring of expectations (Ha, Kose, & Ohnsorge, 2019).   
 
An inflation targeting monetary policy framework, because of its clarity on the nominal 
anchor, demonstrated commitment to the inflation target, and transparent 
communication on what a central bank may do if inflation deviates from the target as 
different feasible shocks materialise, helps in anchoring expectations. In other words, even 
when short-run shocks lead to occasional overshooting/undershooting of the inflation 
trajectory, inflation expectations may still remain little changed, thereby limiting risks in 
terms of altering the wage and price setting behaviour of agents in the economy. When 
inflation deviates from the target in the short-run because of a temporary shock, monetary 
policy credibility becomes the key factor to prevent inflation expectations from getting 
influenced by the shock. If expectations are well anchored around the target, policy could 
“look through” the price level impact. However, if expectations are not anchored and tend 
to firm up in response to short-run adverse shocks, then second round effects on inflation 
become a concern. After the global financial crisis, countries having well anchored inflation 
expectations seem to have also benefitted in terms of their capacity to manage adverse 
global spillovers, i.e., even when exchange rate comes under depreciation pressure in 
response to sudden capital outflows in such economies, smaller exchange rate pass-through 
and lower inflation persistence help in faster return of inflation to the target (International 
Monetary Fund, 2018). 
 
Inflation expectations, despite their importance to assess inflation dynamics in a country, 
however, are not directly observable, leading to use of either survey based or financial 
market based measures of expectations in empirical research. Survey based inflation 
expectations often turn out to be better predictors of actual inflation than model based 
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estimates or financial market data. An assessment of survey based data on inflation 
expectations covering both advanced and emerging economies suggests that household 
expectations are higher and more volatile than inflation expectations of professional 
forecasters. The latter are closer to inflation forecasts of central banks (Ha et al., 2019).  
While inflation expectations are generally heterogeneous for different agents, in South 
Africa, for example, longer-term expectations of analysts generally remain within the 
inflation forecast band (of 3 to 6 per cent), whereas expectations of households, businesses 
and trade unions usually remain above the upper band of the inflation target, besides 
being more volatile (Miyajima & Yetman, 2018).  
In India, 3-months ahead and 1-year ahead inflation expectations of households are 
collected through quarterly surveys by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which are widely 
used for the assessment of inflation outlook, i.e., likely risks to the inflation trajectory 
from possible spillover of inflation expectations through the wage-price setting processes 
in the economy.  What one often fails to recognise in such assessments, however, is the 
distinction between longer-term inflation expectations and shorter-term inflation 
expectations.  “…Short-term inflation expectations, in practice those for one- to two-years 
ahead, should vary with the business cycle and shocks to the economy. Longer term 
inflation expectations, usually thought of as those five years out or more, are anchored if 
the variations in short-term expectations do not affect their level significantly…” (Posen, 
2011). In the empirical literature that aims at examining either how well inflation 
expectations are anchored or whether inflation expectations can predict future inflation, 
accordingly, longer-term inflation expectations (of 5-years ahead that are less sensitive to 
short-term shocks to inflation) collected through survey of professional 
forecasters/consensus forecasts  are often used, which usually validate inflation 
expectations as a key determinant of inflation, besides providing evidence on the extent 
of anchoring under different monetary policy regimes/in different countries (International 
Monetary Fund, 2018). Empirical literature nevertheless also suggests that when 
household inflation expectations are considered, they may outperform both lags of actual 
inflation and survey of professional forecasters (Doser, Nunes, Rao, & Sheremirov, 2017). 
 
Even though longer-term household (HH) inflation expectations data are not available for 
India (unlike the Michigan inflation expectations survey in the US for  five years), given 
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the extensive references to quantitative and qualitative data on inflation expectations of 
households in the assessment of inflation dynamics in India, this paper aims at examining 
the forward looking information content of both 3-months ahead and 1-year ahead 
inflation expectations of households from the stand point of their relevance to the wage-
price dynamics.  Recent empirical findings suggest that the inflation expectation channel 
of monetary policy  works in  India while the output gap channel is weak (Goyal & Parab, 
2019) 
 
Inflation expectations carry the risk of stoking a wage-price spiral. Inflation expectations 
induced generalised wage pressures can often be inflationary, particularly when excess 
demand conditions allow easy pass-through of higher wage costs to output prices.  In the 
absence of excess demand, however, the scope for spillovers from inflation expectations to 
output prices through higher wages could be limited, even as lower profit margins at times 
may absorb some part of the higher wage costs for some time. In turn, in the presence of 
excess demand, easy pass-through of wage costs and higher mark ups may allow firms to 
offer higher wages to retain/motivate labour, leading to a situation where high prices also 
drive higher wages. Changes in labour productivity can at times obscure this assessment, 
i.e., higher wages may just reflect higher productivity rather than excess demand 
conditions.  Because of backward wage indexation, higher wages at times may also reflect 
lagged actual inflation. Thus, a measure of economic slack, trend labour productivity 
growth and inflation expectations represent the key determinants of nominal wages 
(International Monetary Fund, 2017).   Non-availability of high frequency data on 
productivity and employment can complicate assessment of both current inflation 
dynamics and risks to the inflation outlook. When high frequency data on unemployment 
and productivity are not available, however, wage growth itself could be used as a useful 
early warning indicator of inflation.  To the extent that survey based data on household 
inflation expectations could be a determinant of nominal wage growth, they may also be 
useful to predict wage and price inflation.  
 
Set against this context, Section 2 examines the utility of survey based data on inflation 
expectations to explain inflation dynamics in India in a New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
(NKPC) framework. The shape of the Phillips curve in India is evaluated in Section 3 in 
the context of the global debate about challenges to the conduct of monetary policy posed 
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by flattening of the Phillips curve. How household inflation expectations influence the 
wage setting behaviour in India is analysed in section 4. Concluding observations are 
presented in Section 5. 
2 Household Inflation Expectations in the Phillips Curve 
While the theoretical debate on the subject of inflation expectations suggests extreme 
possibilities – the neo-classical endogenous model-consistent forward-looking rational 
expectations on the one hand and the Keynesian exogenous backward-looking 
expectations on the other – the real life expectation formation processes could be best 
explained by a hybrid New-Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) that allows roles for both 
backward and forward-looking information (Hubert & Mirza, 2018; Taylor, 1982). Given 
that hybrid Phillips Curve specifications fit data well and also that actual inflation 
dynamics often exhibit persistence, the micro founded justification for hybrid NKPC 
comes from the assumption that a subset of firms, not all, set prices following a backward 
looking approach. “…While the rational expectations revolution has allowed for great leaps 
in macroeconomic modelling, the surveyed empirical micro-evidence appears increasingly 
at odds with the full-information rational expectation assumption (Coibion, 
Gorodnichenko, & Kamdar, 2018).” 
 
While the assumption of rationality is crucial to theoretical policy frameworks, 
understanding of changing dynamics in an economy may generally be imperfect, and all 
agents that form expectations may also not know exactly the objective function of the 
policy maker (Bernanke, 2007). Expectation formation could be a rational learning process 
and “…learning takes time, the economic scene changes continuously, information is costly 
and not all persons have equal opportunities for access to same information set” (Visco, 
2014) .Given that expectations are unobservable, survey based expectations provide 
necessary information to test the relevance of rational expectations and assess their 
predictive power in analysing inflation dynamics. As against the model-consistent version 
of expectations propounded by (Muth, 1961), directly measured expectations from survey 
data have been used widely for empirical validation of the role of expectations in monetary 
policy analysis. “… Relative to a number of popular alternative measures of inflation 
expectations (lagged inflation, professional surveys, Greenbook expectations, and the 
Cleveland Fed expectations), consumer expectations yield the most stable Phillips curve 
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(CPI-based) and provide the best fit during  recent years. In a horse-race of inflation 
expectations, consumer expectations remain a strong predictor of inflation. (Olivier, 
2017).” Survey based expectations, however, may often yield significantly different results 
from those hypothesised under rational or model-consistent expectations.  
In the theoretical and empirical literature the treatment of inflation expectations in a 
Philips Curve framework to study inflation dynamics has changed significantly over time 
(Gordon, 2011). All broad approaches - the expectations augmented Philips curve, the 
new Keynesian Philips Curve (NKPC) and the hybrid versions of NKPC – however 
emphasise that inflation expectations can influence current inflation. In the Gordon 
triangle approach, inertia, demand and supply are the three key determinants of inflation. 
As per this approach, past inflation reflects generalised inflation inertia; the role of supply 
shocks (which could shift the short-run Philips curve) is explicitly recognised; and, output-
gap can be used as a convenient proxy of demand conditions.  The key point to note in 
this approach is that when past inflation influences current inflation that reflects 
generalised backward looking inertia – arising from either explicit/explicit contracts 
dampening the speed of changes in prices and wages, or input price changes possibly 
taking longer time to transmit through the supply chain to final prices – rather than 
backward looking inflation expectations. In NKPC, however, forward looking inflation 
expectations that respond rationally to policy changes play a key role in influencing 
inflation. Thus, unlike the Gordon approach, this approach does not recognise any role of 
inertia or supply shocks, the latter usually getting suppressed in the error term (Equation 
1). 𝜋֏ = 𝛼𝐸֏−ֆ𝜋֏ր + 𝛽𝑂𝐺 + 𝜖֏               … (1) 
Where 𝜋֏ is inflation, 𝐸֏−ֆ𝜋֏ր is inflation expectation taken in time period 𝑡 − 𝑘 for time 
period 𝑡, 𝑌  is output, and 𝑌 ∗ is potential output, 𝑂𝐺 is output gap defined by պ −պ ∗պ ∗ × 100,𝜖֏ is error term satisfying properties of a white noise. As NKPC does not fit real life data 
well, hybrid versions of NKPC (Clarida, Gali, & Gertler, 1999)  are commonly used in 
practice (Equation 2)2.   
                                                          
2 In empirical estimates when the output gap coefficient is insignificant, that could reflect either output gap 
is a poor proxy of marginal cost (because only under certain restrictions on technology and labour market 
structure that output gap could be a proxy of marginal cost) or incorrect measurement of output gap. In 
pure versions of NKPC, with no role for backward looking expectations or intrinsic inflation inertia, current 
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 𝜋֏ = 𝛼ս𝜋֏−φ + 𝛼ց𝐸֏𝜋֏+φ + 𝛽𝑂𝐺 + 𝜇𝑍֏ + 𝜖֏ … . (2)  
 
Unlike the emphasis of NKPC on model consistent rational expectations, hybrid 
expectations are backward looking as well as forward looking, with the relative size of 
each (when  𝛼ս  and 𝛼ց  are constrained to add up to one, or even otherwise) being a 
country specific empirical issue.  Supply side shocks (𝑍֏) are explicitly recognised as 
plausible determinants of inflation. 𝜖֏ is a white noise error term.  
 
While using survey based measures of inflation expectations as proxies of forward looking 
expectations in the above specifications, one needs to recognise that if household 
expectations are not rational3 then such data cannot be used in NKPC, but in hybrid 
versions of NKPC survey based data on expectations may actually work well. In Poland, 
empirical estimates suggested that survey based measures of inflation expectations (of 
consumers, financial market participants, and business enterprises) perform better than 
model-consistent rational expectations in forecasting inflation (Lyziak, 2016). While 
several empirical studies on India validate the significance of Phillips curve to explain 
variations in inflation - notwithstanding differences in the specification of the Phillips 
curve or in the choice of inflation variable - we add a new dimension to this research by  
applying household inflation expectations as a proxy of forward looking expectations  for  
testing  the performance of the Phillips Curve in explaining inflation dynamics in India 
(for a review of empirical studies on India  please  refer to Behera, Wahi, & Kapur, 
(2017)). Using consensus forecast data in NKPC (augmented with imported inflation, i.e., 
international commodity prices)  Guimaraes & Papi (2016) found both forward looking 
and backward looking components of expectations as key determinants of CPI inflation 
in India, with their respective weights coming close to half.  At higher inflation levels, 
greater inertia (or backward looking expectations) suggested higher sacrifice ratio. 
                                                          
inflation is essentially discounted future marginal costs, i.e., prices are set by firms on assessment of future 
demand and cost conditions, and if monetary policy can credibly commit to keep output gap zero in future, 
disinflation without sacrifice of output is possible.  In real life, however, disinflation involves sacrifice of output. 
 
3 Sharma & Bicchal (2018) used data on wholesale price index (WPI) inflation (for the sample period Q4: 2006 to Q2: 
2015) and Das (2014) used data on WPI and CPI-C (for the sample period September 2008 to December 2013) to test 
the rationality of household inflation expectations in India. 
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Importantly, commodity prices turned out to exert influence on inflation over and above 
what may be already captured in inflation expectations. Patra, Khundrakpam, & George, 
(2014)  tested alternative specifications to establish the relevance of backward looking 
nature of Phillips curve for India to explain wholesale price inflation dynamics, but argued 
that inflation persistence may have four components, including inflation expectations 
measured by one period ahead inflation. Given the challenge of measuring inflation 
expectations, instead of any survey based data, they used one period ahead actual 
inflation, and their estimated coefficient at 0.6 was close to the value of the coefficient of 
intrinsic persistence (or backward looking inflation). Patra & Ray (2010) extracted model 
based inflation expectations to study what factors influence expectations and concluded 
that past inflation, food and fuel shocks, output gap and real interest rate can explain 
variations in  inflation expectations. Model consistent rational expectations are 
incorporated in the framework used by Benes et al. (2017), under which the expectation 
formation process is endogenous to monetary policy credibility (i.e., expectations are more 
backward looking when the credibility is low).   Examining the Phillips curve relationship 
at the state level, Behera et al. (2017) also confirmed the significance of Phillips curve to 
explain inflation dynamics in India, but they assumed expectations to be adaptive in all 
specifications of the Philips curve. Das (2014), using lead WPI inflation as the proxy of 
forward looking expectations over the sample period Q2:1996 to Q4:2013, and imposing 
the restriction that the sum of the coefficients for forward looking and backward looking 
expectations is equal to one, concluded that the coefficient of backward looking 
expectations generally dominated forward looking expectations, implying high degree of 
inflation persistence and resultant lagged impact of monetary policy on inflation.  
 
Given the available empirical support for the relevance of Phillips curve to India, we 
attempt to examine the explanatory power of household inflation expectations in 
explaining variations in CPI-C and CPI-Urban inflation in hybrid versions of the Phillips 
curve.  The RBI survey of inflation expectations of households, conducted since 20054 on 
                                                          
4 According to Das, Lahiri, & Zhao (2016), the RBI’s first survey started in September 2005, and only qualitative 
information was the focus in the first two rounds, collected from four major cities. From the third round in 2006, 
quantitative information   (3-months ahead and 1-year ahead) from twelve cities started being collected. Since the 30th 
round in December 2012, data are being collected from sixteen cities. Since the data would have taken some time to 
stabilise, it may be appropriate to use these data after 2008 for drawing relevant empirical inferences. 
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a quarterly basis, collects quantitative and qualitative information on inflation 
expectations, but the median/mean quantitative value is commonly used to assess how 
expectations behave relative to underlying CPI inflation. Quarterly information on 3-
months ahead and 1-year ahead inflation expectations provide reasonable time series data 
(2008:Q1 to Q3 2018) to test the relevant hypotheses in the paper. As the survey data 
relate to major cities in India, for comparison purpose CPI-urban inflation (new series, 
for which data are available since 2012) as well as CPI-IW (for which longer time series 
data are available) have been used (Annex Figure 1). Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
and Phillips-Perron (PP) test results indicate that the variables of interest are I(1) and 
first difference stationary (Annex Table 1).  
 
Output-gap measures are based on deviations of quarterly GDP from HP filter based 
trend GDP. When only 3-months ahead inflation expectations and output gap are used 
as the determinants of inflation, in all five equations (for CPI-C, CPI-Urban, CPI-IW, 
CPI-C non-food non-fuel, and CPI-Urban non-food non fuel) household inflation 
expectations emerge statistically significant (Table 1). Output gap appears statistically 
significant only for two measures of non-food non-fuel CPI-C and CPI-Urban inflation, 
and not for headline inflation. When oil price shock is included in the modified version of 
the Phillips curve, the explanatory power of each equation improves (Table 2). Similar 
results are obtained when 1-year ahead inflation expectations are used (Table 3 and 4). 
In this section, the aim is to test whether household inflation expectations matter to 
explain inflation dynamics in a Phillips curve framework in India, rather than to capture 
the impact all plausible determinants of inflation, including short-term shocks other than 
fuel.  
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Table 1: Phillips Curve without Oil Price Shock (1-Quarter ahead Inflation 
Expectations) 
 
 CPI Urban 
Inflation 
CPI 
Combined 
Inflation 
Urban Core 
Inflation 
CPI 
Combined 
Core 
Inflation 
CPI –IW 
Inflation 
L.3-Months 
Ahead Inflation 
Expectations  
0.655** 
(0.170) 
0.684** 
(0.178) 
0.371*** 
(0.088) 
0.347*** 
(0.076) 
0.771** 
(0.225) 
      
L1.OUTPUT 
GAP 
0.494 0.527 0.466 0.422 0.584 
 (0.479) (0.521) (0.273) (0.247) (0.573) 
      
L2.OUTPUT 
GAP 
0.586 0.418 0.434 0.342 0.339 
 (0.505) (0.458) (0.244) (0.197) (0.634) 
      
L3.OUTPUT 
GAP 
0.319 0.304 0.234 0.177 0.196 
 (0.385) (0.396) (0.243) (0.211) (0.488) 
      
L4.OUTPUT 
GAP 
0.497 0.395 0.418** 0.330* 0.346 
 (0.284) (0.290) (0.141) (0.118) (0.375) 
      
Constant -0.701 -0.684 1.873 2.313** -1.506 
 (1.634) (1.715) (0.915) (0.733) (2.200) 
Observations 22 22 22 22 22 
Adjusted R2 0.375 0.378 0.442 0.497 0.281 
             Standard errors in parentheses 
                  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 2: Phillips Curve with Oil Price Shock (1- Quarter ahead Inflation 
Expectations) 
 CPI Urban 
Inflation 
CPI 
Combined 
Inflation 
Urban Core 
Inflation 
CPI 
Combined 
Core 
Inflation 
CPI 
(Industri
al 
Worker) 
Inflation 
L. 3-Months 
Ahead Inflation 
Expectations  
0.691** 
(0.173) 
0.722*** 
(0.176) 
0.400*** 
(0.077) 
0.372*** 
(0.063) 
0.793** 
(0.242) 
      
L.OUTPUT GAP 0.406 
(0.342) 
0.434 
(0.363) 
0.394* 
(0.183) 
0.361* 
(0.150) 
0.531 
(0.509) 
      
L2.OUTPUT 
GAP 
0.319 
(0.538) 
0.136 
(0.515) 
0.218 
(0.235) 
0.158 
(0.191) 
0.179 
(0.698) 
      
L3.OUTPUT 
GAP 
0.241 
(0.281) 
0.223 
(0.273) 
0.171 
(0.156) 
0.124 
(0.123) 
0.150 
(0.448) 
      
L4.OUTPUT 
GAP 
0.334 
(0.295) 
0.222 
(0.313) 
0.286* 
(0.117) 
0.218 
(0.111) 
0.248 
(0.418) 
      
Oil Price Shock 0.0855 0.0904 0.0693* 0.0589* 0.0512 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.024) (0.021) (0.072) 
      
Constant -1.207 -1.219 1.463 1.965** -1.809 
 (1.702) (1.734) (0.791) (0.614) (2.419) 
Observations 22 22 22 22 22 
Adjusted R2 0.458 0.476 0.615 0.673 0.265 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3: Phillips Curve without Oil Price Shock (1-Year ahead Inflation 
Expectations) 
 CPI Urban 
Inflation 
CPI 
Combined 
Inflation 
Urban Core 
Inflation 
CPI 
Combined 
Core 
Inflation 
CPI 
(Industrial 
Worker) 
Inflation 
L4.One Year Ahead 
Inflation 
Expectation  
0.524* 
(0.191) 
0.512* 
(0.200) 
0.235 
(0.111) 
0.219* 
(0.092) 
0.675* 
(0.255) 
      
      
L.OUTPUT GAP 0.265 0.262 0.290 0.257 0.356 
 (0.541) (0.585) (0.333) (0.294) (0.610) 
      
L2.OUTPUT GAP 0.976 0.800 0.611 0.507 0.839 
 (0.590) (0.571) (0.341) (0.295) (0.650) 
      
L3.OUTPUT GAP 0.304 0.273 0.198 0.142 0.204 
 (0.485) (0.503) (0.362) (0.310) (0.497) 
      
L4.OUTPUT GAP 0.882* 0.781 0.608* 0.507* 0.826 
 (0.370) (0.391) (0.215) (0.185) (0.442) 
      
Constant -0.200 0.235 2.851* 3.242** -1.573 
 (2.092) (2.217) (1.258) (1.005) (2.940) 
Observations 22 22 22 22 22 
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.126 0.186 0.186 0.156 
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Table 4: Phillips Curve with Oil Price Shock (1-Year ahead Inflation 
Expectations) 
 
 
CPI Urban 
Inflation 
CPI 
Combined 
Inflation 
Urban Core 
Inflation 
CPI Combined 
Core Inflation 
CPI (Industrial 
Worker) Inflation 
L4. 1-Year Ahead 
Inflation Expectations  
0.585* 
(0.215) 
0.575* 
(0.230) 
0.282* 
(0.110) 
0.259* 
(0.101) 
0.715* 
(0.296) 
L.OUTPUT GAP 0.177 
(0.481) 
0.171 
(0.512) 
0.223 
(0.301) 
0.200 
(0.259) 
0.299 
(0.579) 
      
L2.OUTPUT GAP 0.732 
(0.568) 
0.547 
(0.549) 
0.425 
(0.287) 
0.349 
(0.244) 
0.678 
(0.668) 
      
L3.OUTPUT GAP 0.233 
(0.455) 
0.199 
(0.464) 
0.144 
(0.337) 
0.097 
(0.285) 
0.158 
(0.480) 
      
L4.OUTPUT GAP 0.743* 
(0.341) 
0.636 
(0.357) 
0.501* 
(0.180) 
0.417* 
(0.151) 
0.734 
(0.443) 
      
Oil Price Shock 0.092 
(0.056) 
0.096 
(0.059) 
0.070* 
(0.033) 
0.060 
(0.029) 
0.061 
(0.068) 
      
Constant -1.055 
(2.524) 
-0.652 
(2.751) 
2.199 
(1.314) 
2.688* 
(1.199) 
-2.139 
(3.564) 
      
Observations 22 22 22 22 22 
Adjusted R2 0.274 0.222 0.344 0.343 0.145 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
3 The Shape of the Phillips Curve in India 
Wage and price dynamics in both advanced and emerging economies seem to have altered 
dramatically in the last one decade after the global financial crisis, amplifying 
uncertainties surrounding the role of some of the fundamental determinants of inflation – 
economic slack, wage costs, and inflation persistence – in explaining inflation.  Weakening 
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impact of economic slack or flattening of the Phillips curve, declining value of the  
persistence parameter reflecting  improved anchoring of inflation expectations, and 
decaying bargaining power of labour dampening wage-push pressure even when labour 
market conditions tighten have some puzzling dimensions, and country specific empirical 
facts provide varied perspectives on  ways to unravel the puzzle analytically.   
 
Forces that may be altering the influence of some of the key determinants of inflation 
could be - the combined influence of rising employer monopsony power and dwindling 
worker bargaining power, which  represents a major structural shift in labour market 
conditions (Krueger, 2018); concentration of power in product markets (or monopoly 
power of firms shifting the share of national income away from labour or wages  in favour 
of corporates or profits) and  concentration of power in the labour market (or monopsony 
power of employers depressing wages to levels below what competitive markets would 
have fetched) (Bivens, Mishel, & Schmitt, 2018); and,  rising role of global factors (positive 
supply shock stemming from  growing labour and product market integration and 
integrated global value chains) (Carney, 2017), all of which could drive the Phillips curve 
to either shift downward  or  turn flatter. While the role of technology in depressing wages 
and also the share of labour income has often been highlighted, once the adverse job 
destruction/replacement effect of technology is adjusted for two positive effects of 
technology – higher productivity  and creation of new tasks -  the net effect may be 
positive (Carney, 2018).There are also strong structural disinflationary forces which are 
not duly recognised in conventional approaches to inflation analysis – less inclusive 
growth, evident from  rising inequality (in terms of income, wealth and opportunities),   
widespread  economic uncertainty, and reduction in entry barriers (the Amazon effect), 
which  exert downward pressures on prices (El-Erian, 2019). Changing composition of 
labour supply (with rising participation rate of workers in the age group of 55 to 64) may 
be depressing the equilibrium wage rate, and also  dulling the information content of 
unemployment as an indicator of labour market slack (Mojon & Ragot, 2019). 
  
Despite growing evidence on flattening of the Phillips curve, central bank communication 
often tries to emphasise its continued relevance to inflation dynamics, backed by newer 
empirical arguments: “…Phillips curve is alive and kicking when inflation is measured 
using categories that are cyclically sensitive (i.e., Cyclically Sensitive Inflation or CIS)”   
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(Hooper, Mishkin, & Sufi, 2019)”; “…structural conditions for pass-through from wages to 
prices remain in place in the euro area. Over the period from 1985 to 2018, there is a 
continuing link between labour cost and price inflation in the four major euro area 
economies and across the three main sectors (Draghi, 2019)”; and, there are “…two 
empirical Phillips curves – one for twisters, the other for stickers. The twisters’ Phillips 
curve is behaving relatively similarly to the past… But the Phillips curve for stickers looks 
to be somewhat flatter” (Haldane, 2018). On the key issue of whether the Phillips curve 
is “dead, sick, or merely resting”, the essence of central bank communication has been  
that the effects of tight labour markets on inflation might have been reduced, but not 
eliminated – “…I do not see it as likely that the Phillips curve is dead” (Powell, 2018). 
 
3.1. The Indian Experience 
Empirical estimates for India do not show any evidence of flattening of Phillips curve, as 
the estimated  coefficients of output gap  (4 quarters lag) in the Phillips curve equations,  
for both headline CPI and Core (excluding food and fuel) CPI inflation  appear to have 
remained stable over time in the last few years (Figure 1A and 1B).  
 
This evidence, however, is not conclusive, because estimates are highly sensitive to model 
specification, i.e., whether the Phillips curve equation has adaptive expectations (one 
quarter lagged CPI headline or CPI core inflation) or forward-looking household inflation 
expectations (3-months ahead or 1-year ahead). As evident from estimates presented in 
Table 5, output-gap (4 quarter lagged) coefficients are statistically significant only when 
household inflation expectations are used for both CPI headline and CPI-core measures 
of inflation in the Phillips curve equations. In formulations with adaptive expectations, 
output gap coefficients are not significant.   
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Figure 1A: Coefficient of Output Gap (4Q 
lag) in Phillips curve 
(for headline CPI-C Inflation) 
 
Figure 1B: Coefficient of Output Gap (4Q 
Lag) in Phillips Curve 
(for core CPI inflation) 
 
Note: Red dotted lines are 95% confidence interval. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Estimated Coefficients of O-Gap in Estimated Philips Curve Equations 
Variable PC with adaptive 
expectations (or 1Q 
lagged actual 
inflation) 
PC with forward 
looking household 
inflation  expectations 
(3-months ahead) 
PC with forward 
looking household 
inflation  
expectations (1-
months ahead) 
 Headline Core Headline Core Headline Core 
L4.Output Gap 0.005 
(0.173) 
0.022 
(0.079) 
0.472** 
(0.153) 
0.326** 
(0.09) 
0.379* 
(0.173) 
0.281* 
(0.099) 
Adaptive/household 
inflation 
expectations 
0.840*** 
(0.114) 
0.793*** 
(0.095) 
0.828*** 
(0.122) 
0.401*** 
(0.066) 
0.727*** 
(0.133) 
0.360*** 
(0.061) 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 5, 1 and 0.1 per cent levels, respectively. 
The most recent communication of the Reserve Bank of India on this issue highlights the 
continued importance of  Phillips curve to inflation dynamics -  “…a positive shock to the 
output gap increases core and headline inflation and the peak effect occurs with a lag of 
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3-5 quarters, the impact being stronger and faster for core inflation than for headline 
inflation… the Phillips curve is relatively flat for negative output gaps, but the impact 
increases rapidly with positive output gaps” (RBI, 2019)5. 
 
4 Inflation Expectations and Wage Dynamics 
One of the major arguments on the need for monetary policy to anchor inflation 
expectations is that the risk of a wage-price spiral can be averted. Information on 
household inflation expectations collected through surveys may not fully satisfy the 
rational expectations hypothesis, but may still contain useful information to help assess 
how they influence current prices by impacting wage and price setting behaviour of 
economic agents. In the labour market, inflation expectations of both employers (firms) 
and employees may determine nominal wage increases. However, given that acquiring new 
information could be costly, one would expect firms to be more forward looking than 
employees6. If inflation expectations of employees and employers diverge, then 
transmission of the former to wages may depend on the degree of unionisation, or 
bargaining power of labour.  
 
In countries that face uncertainty about availability of data on unemployment, wage 
growth could often be used as an early warning labour market indicator of inflation. Wage 
growth, however, may reflect the impact of a combination of factors – inflation 
expectations, slack in the labour market and labour productivity - and the transmission 
of inflation expectations to inflation may depend on how the latter two factors may be 
evolving. Moreover, in the presence of large involuntary part time employment or 
temporary contracts, transmission of inflation expectations could get dulled. Since the 
                                                          
5 Monetary Policy Report, RBI, April 2019.  
6 In India, unlike household inflation expectations (assumed as expectations of employees) which have 
remained persistently higher than actual inflation, inflation expectations of professional forecasters (whose 
analysis may matter to firms for their investment and pricing decisions) are closer to the inflation trajectory 
projected by the RBI and importantly, inflation expectations of firms (as per the Business Inflation 
Expectations Survey of IIM, Ahmedabad) are closer to actual inflation. This experience is similar to that 
in Poland where anchoring of forward looking expectations of financial analysts and enterprises is found to 
be much higher than backward-looking inflation expectations of consumers (Lyziak, 2016). 
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global financial crisis, subdued wage pressures and declining share of labour in total 
income has complicated assessment of risks to inflation from wages. In the US, the impact 
of tighter labour market conditions on wages has been dampened by decline in trend 
productivity growth and labour share in income, even as other factors such as automation, 
offshoring, decline in unionization and globalisation also played their role (Abdih & 
Danninger, 2018). In most advanced economies, nominal wage growth has been more 
sluggish than what is suggested by standard Phillips curve estimates, and structural 
changes in the bargaining power of labour and competition from foreign workers could 
explain part of the subdued wage growth (Arsov & Evans, 2018).  Greater monopsony 
power of employers (as highly concentrated labour markets depress wages) and weakening 
bargaining power of workers have impacted wage dynamics, entailing implications for 
monetary policy (Krueger, 2018). 
 
The importance of wage dynamics to inflation dynamics is evident from the high share of 
labour income in total income. In India, data from Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 
indicate that the shares of wages (of workers) and total emoluments (of salaried 
employees) taken together constitute about 31.7 per cent of net value added (NVA).  As 
against the industrial sector, for the economy as a whole,  national income data suggest 
that labour share (compensation of employees) in net value added (NVA) is about 34 
percent (Figure 2A and 2B). This would suggest that wage dynamics should matter to 
inflation dynamics, from the stand point of input cost as well as aggregate demand effects 
associated with changes in wage growth.  
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Quarterly data on inflation expectations of households in India (3-months ahead and  1-
year ahead) are plotted in Figure 3 against year-on-year growth in staff costs (for 
manufacturing and services separately)7 to examine whether or not, and to what extent, 
they co-move. The data on inflation expectations relate to select cities and accordingly 
staff costs are used as a proxy for urban wages. Figure 3 shows that there is some degree 
of occasional co-movement, which provides a case for estimating the extent to which any 
change in inflation expectations may influence the rate of change in staff costs8. 
                                                          
7 These data relate to non-government non-financial companies (growth in per employee staff costs) and are sourced 
from https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/Pr_DataRelease.aspx?SectionID=360&DateFilter=Year and capital line database. 
For caveats while using this data for analysis, please see RBI’s Monetary Policy Report of October 2018. Moreover, 
like any nominal data on wages, these data are not adjusted for changes in productivity.  
8 CPI-C back-casted data are taken from the Report of the Expert Committee to Revise and Strengthen the Monetary 
Policy Framework (Chairman: Dr. Urjit R Patel). Such back-casted data are not available for CPI-C (excluding food 
and fuel). Therefore, wherever required, CPI-IW (excluding food and fuel) has been used as a proxy measure of 
underlying inflation. 
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. 
In the absence of data on inflation expectations of households in the rural areas, it is 
hypothesized that if rural households have similar inflation expectations as in the urban 
areas (given the high correlation of 0.97 between CPI-urban and CPI-rural inflation for 
the period January 2012 to February 2018), then inflation expectations of households (one 
year ahead) can also influence rural wages. Time series data on rural wages suffer from 
the problem of a statistical break (i.e., the old series is up to October 2013 and the new 
series is from November 2013, but without a linking factor). Moreover, classification of 
labour groups has changed in both series. If one picks common comparable groups from 
both series, then data on “harvesting” could be used as a proxy for agricultural labourers 
and data on “masons” could be used as a proxy for non-agricultural labourers. Such data 
for the period December 2006 to September 2017 plotted in Figure 4 show that there 
could be some relationship between inflation expectations and rural wages, which could 
become clearer if estimated empirically. 
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Before starting the empirical exercise, it is hypothesised that the wage-setting behaviour 
could be influenced by both past inflation (i.e., backward looking) as well as inflation 
expectations (i.e., forward looking)  (Blanchard, 1986; Gali, 2011; Taylor, 1979). 
Accordingly, the wage setting model used in this paper is: 𝑊֏ = 𝑘 𝑃֏−φᆿ 𝑃 ր֏+φ φ−ᆿ    
Where 𝑊֏ is current wage level, 𝑃֏−φ is previous period price level,  𝑃֏+φր  is expected price 
level, and 𝑘  is a vector of other exogenous factors that affect the wage setting behaviour. 
Here 𝛼 signifies the weightage households assign to past inflation and accordingly 1 − 𝛼 
is the weightage assigned to future expectations. The above equation is reduced to:  𝑊֏?̇?֏ = 𝑑 ?̇?𝑘 + 𝛼 𝑃֏̇−φ𝑃֏−φ + (1 − 𝛼)  ?̇? ր֏+φ   𝑃֏+φր    
The relevance of both backward looking and forward looking inflation to wage setting 
behaviour in India (for manufacturing staff costs, services sector staff costs, agricultural 
wage costs and non-agricultural rural wage costs) is examined. All variables in equations 
relating to harvesting and mason wage growth in Table 6 (proxies for rural wage growth) 
are I(1), while equations relating to manufacturing sector staff cost growth and services 
sector staff cost growth (proxies for urban wage growth) have a mix of I(0) and I(1). For 
drawing empirical inferences, therefore, the vector error correction model (VECM) is used 
for the former (Table 7 and 8) while an auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) model is 
used for the later (Table 9).  Ordinary least square (OLS) estimates are used first in Table 
6 only to check whether the restriction of sum of two coefficients adding to one works for 
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the Indian data. Each equation is estimated twice, i.e.,  without imposing any restriction 
on the coefficients of backward looking and forward looking inflation expectations, and 
then imposing the restriction that these  two coefficients add up to one (Table 6a and 
6b). As per Wald test, the restricted version is not supported only for mason wage growth, 
while in terms of the sign of the coefficients, the restricted version does not work for 
services sector wage growth.  
 
Table 6a: Inflation Expectations and Wage Growth (Unrestricted) 
 Harvesting 
Wage 
Growth  
Mason 
Wage 
Growth  
Manufacturing 
per Employee 
Staff Cost 
Growth 
Services per 
Employee Staff 
Cost Growth  
Median One Year 
Ahead Inflation 
Expectations 
0.795* 
(0.317) 
0.845*** 
(0.172) 
-1.854*  
 (0.813) 
0.307   
 (0.678) 
Inflation (CPI -C) 
Quarterly Average 
(t-1) 
0.678 
(0.443) 
0.794** 
(0.242) 
1.860** 
(0.650) 
-0.412  
 (0.599) 
Dec2013-Sep2014_D 2.566* 
(1.086) 
2.346** 
(0.756) 
  
Post_Dec_2014_D -9.188*** 
(2.058) 
-5.431*** 
(1.213) 
  
Constant 1.804 
(3.266) 
-2.399 
(1.683) 
9.039  
 (7.169) 
7.926 
 (7.549) 
Observations 46 46 41 41 
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.88 0.20 0.01 
Wald Test  
(Coefficient of median 1-year Inflation Expectations + coefficient of  last period CPI–C  
quarterly average inflation =1 ) 
F 1.97 13.89 2.62 2.08 
Prob > F (p-
values) 
0.17 0.00 0.11 0.16 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 6b: Inflation Expectations and Wage Growth (Restricted) 
 Harvesting 
Wage 
Growth  
Mason Wage 
Growth  
Manufacturing per 
Employee Staff 
Cost Growth 
Services per 
Employee Staff 
Cost Growth  
Median One Year 
Ahead Inflation 
Expectations 
0.731** 0.759*** 0.441 2.212*** 
 (0.275) (0.163) (0.420) (0.342) 
Inflation (CPI -C) 
Quarterly Average 
(t-1) 
0.269 0.241 0.559 -1.212*** 
 (0.275) (0.163) (0.420) (0.342) 
Dec2013-
Sep2014_D 
2.719 2.552**   
 (1.993) (1.179)   
Post_Dec_2014_
D 
-11.22*** -8.177***   
 (1.958) (1.158)   
     
Constant 6.174*** 3.498*** 2.618 -8.550*** 
 (0.787) (0.466) (1.591) (1.297) 
Observations 46 46 43 43 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Estimated coefficients would indicate that inflation expectations of households may 
matter for rural agricultural and non-agricultural wage setting, but not in the organised 
manufacturing or services sector. One presumes, in the manufacturing sector, this reflects 
weaker bargaining power of labour because of similar factors highlighted in the literature 
for other countries – globalisation and cheaper imports, automation, monopsony power of 
employers due to concentration of production in large firms, wakening unionisation, etc. 
In the services sector, particularly in skill intensive areas, however, one expects relatively 
greater bargaining power of labour, and therefore one would expect staff costs to be 
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sensitive to inflation expectations. These aspects are examined further using VECM and 
ARDL results (Table 7, 8 and 9).   
 
The second stage of this exercise is to find out whether or not higher wages (influenced 
by inflation expectations) give rise to higher inflation, besides whether wages are 
influenced by past inflation and/or inflation expectations.  This aspect was studied in 
detail by Kundu (2018) for India, and she found that prices influence wages, rather than 
wages influencing prices, implying limited risk of a wage-price spiral. These findings were 
based on estimates that used data on rural wages for the period November 2013 to 
November 2017.  We use quarterly data for the period December 2006 to June 2018 in 
the VECM model, controlling for two dummies: Dec2013-Sep2014_D and 
Post_Dec_2014_D. The monthly wage series was revised in November 2013. Therefore 
in wage growth calculation from November 2013 to October 2014 both old and new data 
are used. To control for this data revision effect we have created a dummy Dec2013-
Sep2014_D, which takes the value 1 if the quarter falls in between December 2013 and 
September 2014, else 0. From December onwards the wage growth has been calculated 
using new data only, and to control for this we have used a dummy Post_Dec_2014_D 
which is 1 if the quarter is after December 2014, else 0.  It is observed that  agricultural 
wage growth (both for harvesting and mason)  influences inflation and vice-versa, with 
the presence of  long-run co-integrating vectors (and  the statistically significant error 
correction terms falling within  -1 to 0 not only  validate the presence of long term 
relationships but also indicate  short-run adjustments to restore the long-run equilibrium) 
(Table 7 and 8). For staff costs (both manufacturing and services), ARDL results suggest 
that inflation expectations influence growth in services sector staff costs, but the influence 
on growth in manufacturing staff costs turns out to be  perverse.   
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Table 7: Vector Error Correction Model for Harvesting Wage Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆.Harvesting 
Wage Growth 
Rate t 
∆.One Year 
Ahead Median 
Inflation 
Expectations 
∆. CPI Inflation 
Quarterly 
Average 
Error Correction Term -0.300*** -0.0186 0.0955** 
 (0.0779) (0.0601) (0.0466) 
∆.Harvesting Wage 
Growth t-1 
0.287** -0.0680 -0.00557 
 (0.134) (0.103) (0.0799) 
∆. One Year Ahead 
Median Inflation 
Expectations t-1 
0.142 -0.00974 0.292** 
 (0.208) (0.161) (0.125) 
∆.Inflation (CPI -C) 
Quarterly Average t-2 
-0.561** -0.121 0.0748 
 (0.269) (0.207) (0.161) 
Constant -0.0282 0.0774 -0.0734 
 (0.305) (0.235) (0.183) 
Observations  44 44 
 
Long-run Relationship 
Harvesting Wage Growth Rate=2.72***×CPI Inflation Quarterly Average (t-1) 
+0.16× One Year Ahead Median Inflation Expectations + 5.53*** 
         *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Vector Error Correction Model for Mason Wage Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆.Mason Wage 
Growth Rate t 
∆. One Year Ahead 
Median Inflation 
Expectations t-1 
∆.Inflation 
Quarterly Average 
Error Correction 
Term 
-0.200*** 0.0148 0.211** 
 (0.0765) (0.116) (0.0848) 
∆.Mason Wage 
Growth t-1 
0.192* -0.0337 0.289** 
 (0.107) (0.162) (0.119) 
∆. One Year 
Ahead Median 
Inflation 
Expectations t-1 
-0.211 -0.140 0.0369 
 (0.152) (0.230) (0.169) 
    
∆.Inflation (CPI -
C) Quarterly 
Average t-2 
0.336** 0.170 0.358** 
 (0.141) (0.213) (0.156) 
Constant -0.0539 0.0774 -0.0564 
 (0.156) (0.235) (0.173) 
Observations 44 44 44 
Long Run Relationship 
Mason Wage Growth Rate=2***× CPI Inflation Quarterly Average (t-1)+0.27× One 
Year Ahead Median Inflation Expectations t-1 + 6.18*** 
                  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: ARDL Model Results 
 (1) (2) 
 ∆.Manufacturing Staff 
Cost Growth Rate 
∆.Services Staff Cost 
Growth Rate 
ADJUSTMENT TERM   
Manufacturing Staff Cost Growth 
Rate t-1 
-0.622*** 
(0.117) 
 
Services Staff Cost Growth Rate t-
1 
 -0.709*** 
(0.126) 
LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP   
Inflation (CPI -C) Quarterly 
Average t-1 
0.104 
(0.347) 
-0.963** 
(0.364) 
Median 1-Year Ahead Inflation 
Expectations t-1 
-0.965** 
(0.446) 
1.552*** 
(0.445) 
SHORT-RUN RELATIONSHIP   
∆.Manufacturing Staff Cost 
Growth Rate t-1 
0.529*** 
(0.129) 
 
∆.Manufacturing Staff Cost 
Growth Rate t-2 
0.238 
(0.143) 
 
∆.Manufacturing Staff Cost 
Growth Rate t-3 
0.384** 
(0.146) 
 
∆.Inflation (CPI -C) Quarterly 
Average 
0.0649 
(0.217) 
-0.683** 
(0.299) 
∆.Median 1-Year Ahead Inflation 
Expectations 
0.0485 
(0.394) 
1.100*** 
(0.397) 
∆.Services Staff Cost Growth 
Rate t-1 
 0.326** 
(0.128) 
∆.Services Staff Cost Growth 
Rate t-2 
 0.333** 
(0.134) 
Constant 13.54*** -2.080 
 (3.105) (3.192) 
Observations 40 40 
Adjusted  R2 0.48 0.42 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bound test has been made and it 
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confirms existence of long run relationship. 
 
 
Thus, there is some empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that high inflation 
expectations of households influence wage dynamics in the services sector. For rural wages, 
convergence to long-run steady state results through adjustments in wages and inflation, 
and not in inflation expectations. This, however, does not stand the test of robustness, 
because inflation expectations data collected from cities should matter more for analysing 
growth in staff costs in the organised sector rather than for rural wages.  
 
5 Conclusions  
The usefulness of survey-based information collected by the RBI on inflation expectations 
of households is examined in this paper from the stand point of their relevance to explain 
inflation dynamics in India and also for forecasting inflation. While rationality is necessary 
for inflation expectations to be incorporated in a new Keynesian Philips Curve (NKPC), 
hybrid versions of NKPC often fit actual inflation data better, which also provide a more 
realistic framework to test the information content of any survey based measure of 
inflation expectations. In five different specifications of modified versions of NKPC (for 
CPI-C, CPI-Urban, CPI-IW, CPI-C non-food non-fuel, and CPI-Urban non-food non-
fuel), it is found that household expectations emerge as a statistically significant predictor 
of actual inflation. As household expectations are adaptive, however, in hybrid NKPC 
specifications household inflation expectations effectively work more as a substitute of 
adaptive expectations. An empirical assessment of the slope of the Phillips curve suggests 
that the Phillips curve remains relevant as the time varying output gap coefficient is 
found to be reasonably stable. High observed inflation persistence, however, warrants 
sustained focus of monetary policy on anchoring inflation expectations.  
 The assessment of relationship between inflation expectations and wages -  the key 
channel for transmission of inflation expectations to inflation – often requires information 
on other key determinants of wages, such as slack in labour market/unemployment rate, 
labour productivity, trend change in labour share in total income, and other factors such 
as automation, offshoring, unionization and globalisation. Notwithstanding the potential 
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impact of several factors (some unobserved/difficult to identify), any empirical evidence 
on inflation expectations influencing wages could be a clear risk to the inflation outlook. 
For India, growth in staff costs in manufacturing and services activities is used as a proxy 
of wage growth, given that inflation expectations data relate to cities. It is observed that 
inflation expectations have a statistically significant influence on growth in staff costs in 
the services sector, but not in manufacturing.  
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Annex Table 1: Unit Root Test Results (at 10 per cent) 
Variables Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron Integration 
Data in Levels 
CPI – Urban Inflation -1.390 
(0.56) 
-1.067 
(0.71) 
I(1) 
CPI-C Inflation -0.932 
(0.75) 
-0.929 
(0.76) 
I(1) 
CPI-IW Inflation  -1.305 
(0.67) 
-1.289 
(0.63) 
I(1) 
 -2.657 
(0.09) 
-2.719 
(0.08) 
I(0) 
 -2.470 
(0.13) 
-2.450 
(0.13) 
I(1) 
Output Gap -3.247 
(0.01) 
-2.673 
(0.07) 
I(0) 
Harvesting Wage 
Growth Rate 
-1.296 
(0.63) 
-1.508 
(0.52) 
I(1) 
Mason Wage Growth 
Rate 
-1.209 
(0.67) 
-1.177 
(0.68) 
I(1) 
Manufacturing Staff 
Cost Growth Rate 
-3.933 
(0.01) 
-2.880 
(0.04) 
I(0) 
Services Staff Cost 
Growth Rate 
-3.018 
(0.03) 
-2.632 
(0.08) 
I(0) 
Data in First Differences 
CPI – Urban Inflation -2.960 
(0.05) 
-6.446 
(0.00) 
I(0) 
CPI-C Inflation) -3.691 
(0.01) 
-6.443 
(0.00) 
I(0) 
CPI-IW Inflation  -5.790 
 (0.00) 
-5.806  
 (0.00) 
I(0) 
 -8.205 
(0.00) 
-9.890 
(0.00) 
I(0) 
Manufacturing Staff 
Cost Growth Rate 
-3.754 
(0.00) 
-5.330 
(0.00) 
I(0) 
Services Staff Cost 
Growth Rate 
-2.747 
(0.07) 
-4.100 
(0.001) 
I(0) 
                 p-values in parenthesis 
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Annex Figure 1: Inflation Expecations of Households 
and different Measures of CPI Inflation 
3-months ahead Inflation Expectations 1-year ahead Inflation Expectations
CPI (IW) CPI (Urban)
CPI (Combined)
